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Impulsive (low self-control) behaviour is linked to mental health issues (Tangney, Baumeister, 
& Boone, 2004), unemployment (Wright, Caspi, Moffitt, & Silva, 1999), and criminal 
behaviour (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Baron, 2003; Moffitt et al., 2011). Research on the 
causes of self-control failure can aim to ameliorate some of these societal concerns. The current 
study therefore set out to explore whether impulsive behaviour could be predicted through goal 
motivation, as moderated by self-esteem. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: (a) 15 minutes of personal social media use; or (b) 15 minutes of personal academic 
study, following which, all participants completed cognitive tasks as a measure of state self-
control. Self-esteem was measured pre-manipulation through both implicit and explicit 
measures. Previous literature on social media has found its users to experience a short-term 
increase in state self-esteem (Toma, 2013). In contrast, the perception of negative academic 
performance causes a decrease in state self-esteem (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989). 
Furthermore, this drop in state self-esteem lasts longer for individuals low in self-esteem 
(Metalsky, Halberstadt, & Abramson, 1987). An individual’s motivation to pursue goals is 
determined by that individual’s relationship with their environment (Ross & Nisbett, 2011). It 
was predicted in the current study that decreased motivation to approach, or increased 
motivation to avoid the pursuit of a goal, would lead to decreased self-control. As hypothesised, 
low implicit self-esteem individuals exhibited significantly less self-control following the 
performance of academic study than with social media. In contrast, high self-esteem 
individuals exhibited significantly less self-control following the performance of social media 









1.1 Overview and Rationale  
With over 4.1 billion people worldwide now using the internet (Statista 2018), online 
(digital) media use is projected to overtake television use as the most time-consuming media 
format for US adults in 2019 (Zenith Media, 2017). The growth of the World Wide Web has 
“opened a new domain in social interactivity with the promise of increasing efficiency and 
worldwide understanding” (Nalwa & Anand, 2003, p.653). As technology continues to 
develop, so does our behaviour towards it. Individuals utilise online media to satisfy goals 
which pertain to their personal needs. According to research into uses and gratifications theory 
(Katz, Blumler & Gurevitch, 1973), online media use (i.e., social media) is predominantly 
driven by the following two motives: (a) to satisfy socio-affective regulation, and/or (b) for the 
acquisition of goods and information (goods-and-information acquisition; Weiser, 2001). 
Individuals engage in socio-affective regulation as a means of regulating emotion through 
immediate social gratification, that is, social media (Weiser, 2001). In contrast, individuals 
engage in goods-and-information acquisition in order to access and share utilitarian content 
online (Weiser, 2001), that is, academic material. These two categories of media usage can 
either affirm or conflict with an individual’s goals. The purpose of the current study is to 
investigate how self-esteem affects an individual’s goal motivation towards the consumption 
of different formats of media, and the subsequent affect this relationship has on state self-
control.  
Goals serve as the purpose and intent that drives human behaviour (Locke, 1981). The 
goals that an individual is motivated to pursue are a reflection of an individual’s self-identity 
(Markus & Wurf, 1987); therefore, an individuals’ self-worth is contingent upon success at 




are central to an individual’s goal schema. People are motivated to perform goal-directed 
behaviour to achieve goals that satisfy their individual needs (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000). 
Goal affirmation is the product of congruency between an individual’s current behaviour within 
their environment and their superordinate goals. Individuals have increased motivation to 
engage in goal-directed behaviour which affirms these superordinate goals. Consequently, 
individuals exhibit optimal self-control when primed with environments that promote goal 
affirmation. In contrast, goal conflict is defined as the result of dissonance between one’s 
actions and goals (Slocum, Cron, & Brown, 2002). Both subordinate and superordinate goals 
compete for use of the same personal resources (executive functions i.e. cognitive and affective 
processes, self-control) and intangible resources (physical and mental exertion, time). As such, 
individuals have decreased motivation to engage in goal-directed behaviour that conflicts with 
the pursuit of superordinate goals. As a result, individuals will exhibit sub-optimal self-control 
when placed in environments that promote goal conflict.  
Self-esteem and goal motivation have a bi-directional relationship. Trait self-esteem 
helps determine the goals that an individual perceives themselves as capable of achieving; and 
state self-esteem fluctuates as a result of subsequent success or failure at these goals (Brown & 
Marshall, 2006). Individuals differ in their trait self-esteem levels: high self-esteem (HSE) 
individuals have more confidence pursuing difficult goals, whereas low self-esteem (LSE) 
individuals behave in a more risk-averse nature (Bandura, 1993; Baumeister, Bushman, & 
Campbell, 2000; Hassell & Sukalich, 2016). As such, HSE individuals pursue future-oriented 
or long-term (LT) goals for goods-and-information acquisition in order to satisfy their need for 
personal growth, whereas LSE individuals pursue present-oriented or short-term (ST) goals in 
order to boost and maintain their self-esteem (psychological needs) through socio-affective 
regulation. Goal pursuit can therefore be characterised by two distinct and divergent pathways 




These pathways produce fundamentally different behaviours, with one pathway 
facilitating implicit or impulsive behaviour, and the other facilitating explicit or controlled 
behaviour (Jordan et al., 2003). The current study predicts that individuals utilise controlled 
(high self-control) behaviour when placed in an environment that affirms their superordinate 
goals, due to increased motivation to engage in environments that support an individual’s 
motives and needs. In contrast, individuals are predicted to utilise impulsive (low self-control) 
behaviour when primed with environments that elicit goal conflict, due to decreased motivation 
to engage in subordinate goals that do not support an individual’s motives and needs. Goal 
conflict was elucidated in HSE individuals through the performance of social media, whereas 
academic study was utilised to elucidate goal conflict in LSE individuals. State self-control 
was measured through an individual’s capacity to inhibit responding during self-control tasks. 
 
1.2 The Self 
Self-esteem exists as a component of the self-system (Sullivan, 1953). The self-system 
comprises the domains and goals specific to an individual (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Domains 
include an individual’s various roles, social identities, and belief systems (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006). The self-system can be conceptualised as a compilation of all the different contingencies 
through which an individual determines their own worth (Wolfe & Crocker, 2003; Sherman & 
Cohen, 2006). Self-identity is formed from an individual’s perception of their own self-system 
(Oyserman, Elmore, & Smith, 2012). People are motivated by validation from goals in domains 
on which their self-worth is contingent (Crocker & Park, 2004). The more central a domain is 
to an individual’s self-identity, the more motivation an individual has to pursue goal-directed 
behaviour in that specific domain (Boninger, Krosnick & Berent, 1995; Steele, 1988). Goals 
that are central to the self therefore command priority of resources in comparison with goals 




individual contributes to the pursuit of a goal, the more central this goal becomes to the self. 
Self-esteem is therefore more contingent on the success of superordinate goals than of 
subordinate goals (Brown & Marshall, 2006). As a consequence, goals often compete for 
resources, resulting in goal conflict. Goal conflict leads to sub-optimal self-control as the 
individual determines whether the expenditure of said resources are best reserved or expended 
elsewhere. It is anticipated that individuals are motivated to perform goal-directed behaviour 
that is congruent with their goal schema (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). As such, it is 
predicted that HSE and LSE individuals may experience goal conflict under different 
conditions.  
 
1.3 Self-Esteem  
Self-esteem is defined as the degree to which people perceive themselves as capable, 
significant, and worthy (Gardner & Pierce, 1998). It can be viewed as both a bottom-up and 
top-down process. From the bottom-up perspective, self-esteem is proposed as an accumulation 
of micro-attributes (individual thoughts, feelings, and actions) that, when aggregated over a 
period of time, amount to somewhat of a running total, much like a bank account (Brown & 
Dutton, 1995). Boosts to state self-esteem follow from success in the discriminative domain in 
which the goal was accomplished (Crocker & Park, 2004). Over time, boosts or dips in state 
self-esteem can have an impact on trait (or global) self-esteem. Trait self-esteem is more 
constant over time than state self-esteem, which is more labile, depending on environment. 
From this perspective, trait self-esteem is understood as the overall evaluation of personal 
worth that people make and maintain with regards to themselves (Vogel, Rose, Roberts, & 
Eckles, 2014). 
In contrast, the top-down perspective of self-esteem maintains that a view of oneself 




(Brown, Dutton & Cook, 2001; Brown & Marshall, 2006; Brown & Dutton, 1995). Within this 
view, global self-esteem is defined as the way a person typically feels about themselves 
(Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Brown & Marshall, 2006). The current research identifies with 
both of these perspectives and subsequently derives an adapted narrative for self-esteem, 
proposing that individuals take feedback received from iterations of success and failure in 
different domains and use that feedback to determine feelings of self-worth. In turn, individuals 
utilise these feelings of self-worth (self-esteem) to perform self-appraisal in regard to the goals 
they can successfully pursue, in order to satisfy internal needs and motives (Maslow, 1943, 
1954, 1970).  
Failure at goals that are linked to self-esteem results in reductions in state self-esteem, 
as well as increases in negative emotions such as shame, anger, and sadness (Crocker & Park, 
2004). The motivational consequences of LSE come as a result of situations where self-esteem 
can be boosted, or threatened (Kernis, 2003). Consequently, LSE and HSE individuals pursue 
different goals to satisfy different needs.  
 
1.4 Differences in Self-Esteem  
Differences in self-esteem are pronounced and predicated throughout psychological 
literature. Individuals with HSE rate themselves as attractive, intelligent, socially skilled, 
outgoing, unselfish, emotionally stable, and morally sound (Heatherton & Vohs, 2000). HSE 
individuals appear to use better self-regulatory strategies in performance contexts (Baumeister, 
Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003), and generally predict higher possibilities of task success 
than LSE individuals (Gardner & Pierce, 1998). These individuals “commit to higher goals, 
engage in more difficult tasks, persevere with challenges and visualise success” (Bandura, 




self-confidence after failure than LSE individuals (Crocker & Park, 2004, Baumeister et al., 
2003).  
In contrast, LSE is characterised by less positive feelings towards oneself (Brown & 
Dutton, 1995). LSE individuals are less resilient, less optimistic (Crocker & Park, 2004), fail 
to cope with adversity, and devote less effort to ascertaining the skills required for successful 
task performance (Gardner & Pierce, 1998). In light of this previous research, the current study 
proposes that self-esteem is best understood as a resource. Individuals vary in the amount of 
this resource they possess (conceptualised as global or trait self-esteem). The amount of self-
esteem an individual has, determines the goals that an individual pursues. Self-esteem in this 
sense is analogous to another resource, money. Both of these resources prescribe a measure of 
value or worth that is used to determine the opportunities available to an individual. If one 
individual has $10, and another other has $100, which individual is likely to be more cautious 
about spending $5? The worth of $5 is relative to whether you have $10 or $100, as 
demonstrated by the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1954). Similarly, the potential loss or 
gain of self-esteem is more valued to an LSE individual than an individual with HSE. Just as 
money allows individuals the luxury of pursuing expensive hobbies, self-esteem affords 
individuals the potential to pursue goals without a fear of failure (Brown & Marshall, 2006).  
Research conducted by Steele, Spencer, & Lynch (1993) found that HSE individuals 
have more affirmational resources and consequently are more resilient to threatening events. 
In contrast, LSE individuals have fewer affirmational resources to employ when they 
experience ego threat, resulting in greater emotional distress (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & 
Nisbett, 1992; Steele et al., 1993; Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993). Consequently, LSE 
individuals lack confidence in themselves and as a result are more sensitive to avoiding risk 




of esteem (Brown & Dutton, 1995). Therefore, LSE individuals are motivated to avoid failure, 
whereas HSE individuals are motivated to approach success (Baumeister, Tice & Hutton, 
1989). Due to this disparity in self-perspective, HSE and LSE individuals perceive themselves 
to possess the capacity to pursue different goals in order to satisfy their respective needs. 
 
1.5 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
Goals mediate the fulfilment of an array of different needs (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000; 
Austin & Vancouver, 1996). As per Austin and Vancouver (1996, p. 338), goals can be defined 
as “internal presentations of desired states”. Behaviour is driven by goals, and goal-directed 
behaviour is motivated by sensitivity to reward or punishment (Carver & White, 1994). Needs 
and goals differ in their complexity and difficulty to fulfil (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000). This 
proposition forms the basis of Maslow’s work on the hierarchy of needs and motives (1943, 
1954, 1970) (refer to Appendix A, Figure 1). Maslow proposed the hierarchy of needs as a 
template for humankind’s intrinsic motivation to seek out and achieve certain needs from their 
environment. Needs are structured in hierarchy of importance, where resources are primarily 
devoted to fundamental needs such as food, rest, and safety. Following ascertainment of these 
basic needs, individuals can divert resources to fulfil psychological needs such the development 
of friendships, intimacy, and self-esteem (McLeod, 2018). These are known as deficit needs 
(Maslow, 1970). The motivation to satisfy deficit needs diminishes as they are fulfilled; in 
other words, the need for hunger, shelter and self-esteem diminishes as it is achieved.  
Following the satisfaction of these psychological needs, individuals can focus their 
energy, or resources towards self-actualization needs such as personal growth and new 
experiences. These are known as growth needs (Maslow, 1970). Motivation to satisfy growth 




success) and creative endeavours. The motivation to satisfy these needs increases as they are 
fulfilled (McLeod, 2018). The current study proposes that LSE individuals (self-perception of 
limited resources), are motivated to satisfy self-esteem needs i.e. deficit needs, whereas HSE 
individuals (self-perception of more abundant resources) can focus on satisfying growth needs 
i.e. self-actualization needs. This echoes the sentiment that LSE individuals seek self-
protection, whereas HSE individuals seek self-enhancement (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 
1993; Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). An individual whose psychological needs (self-
esteem) are already met (i.e., HSE individuals) is able to devote more resources to fulfilling 
higher-order self-actualization needs such as focusing on a career, living a meaningful life, or 
scholarly success. It is proposed that only once an LSE individual fulfils their psychological 
needs, can self-actualization needs become their prime focus. This does not mean that LSE 
individuals are unable to attend to higher-order needs, but this may be the cause of goal conflict 
due to competition for resources with superordinate goals within an LSE individual’s current 
goal schema.  
For the purposes of the current study, superordinate goals fulfil needs that are of higher 
importance to the individual. Environments where an individual’s needs are met promote goal 
affirmation; environments that do not facilitate an individual’s needs consequently promote 
goal conflict. An individual is motivated to engage in an environment that promotes goal 
affirmation, and disengage from environments that conflict with goals. Conflicting goals are 
likely to inhibit each other when they are required to compete for limited resources (Fishbach, 





1.6 Goal Difficulty 
The current study divides needs into growth needs and deficit needs as per Maslow 
(1970). Long-term (LT) and short-term (ST) goals are terms used abstractly to denote the 
amount of resources required for an individual to satisfy these needs. Goal magnitude is 
determined by goal difficulty, amount of resources required to achieve the goal, and length of 
time required for successful goal pursuit. LT goals are rewarded as a function of delayed 
gratification. Moreover, LT goals are those that require more physical and mental exertion, 
take longer to accomplish, are more difficult to accomplish, and as a result, are less likely to 
succeed. However, LT goals are future-oriented and provide greater LT benefit. In contrast, ST 
goals are focused on the present and rewarded through immediate gratification. 
HSE individuals are more likely to view LT goals as a way to maximise potential 
reward, and are therefore motivated to perform within environments that affirm such goals, as 
per the equation: 
   𝐻𝑆𝐸 ×  𝐿𝑇 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 = 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
Hungarian-American psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi proposed that, due to a 
concept he coined as flow theory, people are compelled to engage in tasks that balance with 
their skill level, at the expense of diverting attention away from other tasks (Rosen, Carrier, & 
Cheever, 2013). Tasks that do not provide enough of a challenge to individuals can be 
perceived as understimulating or boring. These tasks subsequently promote disengagement 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). By pursuing ST goals that satisfy a deficit need 
such as the pursuit of self-esteem, HSE individuals are expending personal resources towards 
a need that yields no further growth or benefit, as for HSE individuals these needs have already 
been met. Therefore, this behaviour is summarised as: 




Furthermore, tasks that are too difficult also promote disengagement, as these tasks are 
a cause of anxiety or threat (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). As such, LSE individuals 
view LT goals as threatening to their ego, due to a lack of confidence in their ability to succeed. 
This results in goal conflict for LSE individuals, as denoted by the equation: 
𝐿𝑆𝐸 ×  𝐿𝑇 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 =  𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 
Instead, LSE individuals look to satisfy potential reward through the pursuit of ST 
goals. The probability of success is higher for the pursuit of ST goals than for LT goals. 
Furthermore, gratification for successful ST goal pursuit is received immediately, in 
comparison with the delayed gratification yielded through the successful pursuit of LT goals. 
As such, the pursuit of ST goals elicits goal affirmation in LSE individuals, as per the equation:  
𝐿𝑆𝐸 × 𝑆𝑇 𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 =  𝑔𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
The current study will investigate how individuals respond when primed with 
environments that elucidate goal conflict. I propose that goal conflict elicits impulsive 
responding, whereas goal affirmation elicits controlled responding. This divergent behaviour 
can be explained from the perspective of dual-process models. Epstein and Morling’s (1995) 
cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) proposed that people have two distinct, yet 
interacting, psychological networks that determine human behaviour (Hofmann, Friese, & 
Strack, 2009; Spalding & Hardin, 1999). These dual-process models provide an account for 






1.7 Dual-Process Models 
Various dual-process models have been proposed throughout relevant literature, such 
as the hot–cool system (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999), impulsive versus reflective model (RIM; 
Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Hoffman, Friese, & Strack, 2009), and fast/system 1 versus 
slow/system 2 processes (Kahneman & Egan, 2011). From the perspective of psychoanalytic 
theory, these pathways are viewed as a seesaw between (a) an impulse-driven, largely irrational 
system driven by immediate gratification and known as primary process thinking; and (b) a 
patient, logical, secondary process thinking system that is motivated by delayed gratification 
in order to attend to future-oriented LT goals and gains (Hilgard, 1962; Hoch & Loewenstein, 
1991). The current study chose to denote these divergent pathways as system 1 and system 2 
respectively, as per the work of Kahneman (2011). I predicted that individuals use system 1 
processes to facilitate behaviour when primed with goal conflict. Moreover, I predicted that 
when primed with goal affirmation, individuals use system 2 processes in order to facilitate 
behaviour.  
 
1.8 System 1 Processes 
The first system is referred to as the experiential system, which operates at an 
unconscious level with little effort or deliberation (Jordan et al., 2003). This pathway is largely 
responsible for behaviour that is implicit, unconscious, or automatic in nature (Hofmann, 
Friese, & Strack, 2009). Automatic or system 1 (hot, fast, reactive, impulsive) processes are 
responsive to stimulus control, focused on the present, sensitive to punishment and threats, and 
operate impulsively (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). System 1 (primary) processes are efficient 
in terms of resource expenditure required to perform behaviour, yet rigid in the repertoire of 




system 1 processes are responsible for avoidance-motivated behaviour that individuals use to 
disengage from goal conflict (Elliot, 1999; Blascovich, 2013). As per the dual-attitudes model 
proposed by Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler (2000), these system 1 processes largely occur 
automatically or implicitly, and therefore, implicit self-esteem was investigated. 
1.8.1 Implicit self-esteem. Implicit self-esteem has been defined as “a self-evaluation 
that occurs unintentionally and often outside of awareness” (Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 
1999). On account of this, implicit measures are required to investigate the spontaneous or 
automatic responses that individuals make in relation to the unconscious views that one holds 
of themselves (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). As a result, the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) was developed by Greenwald and Banaji (1995) in order to provide a reliable measure 
of implicit social cognition (Ge, Huo, & Wenger, 2018). The IAT has been adopted as the most 
recognised measure of implicit self-esteem, as it is more reliable than other implicit measures 
in terms of internal consistency and test–retest reliability, and less subject to impression 
management than self-report measures (Dentale, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2016). Farnham 
et al. (1999) suggested that if a genuine measurement of self-esteem is wanted, methods 
involving self-presentation should be bypassed completely through the use of indirect 
(implicit) measures of self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003).  
 
1.9 System 2 Processes 
The second system is the conscious system of behaviour. It operates on an explicit level 
and is prompted by reason (Jordan et al., 2003). Controlled or system 2 (cool, slow, deliberate, 
reflective) processes consist of rational, effortful, and deliberate behaviour that is “responsible 
for higher order mental operations” (Hoffman, Friese, & Strack, 2009; Metcalfe and Mischel, 




resource expenditure required to perform behaviour, yet flexible in the repertoire of behaviours 
they govern (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The current study proposes that system 2 
processes are responsible for the approach-motivated behaviour that individuals use to engage 
in environments that promote goal affirmation (Elliot, 1999; Blascovich, 2013). As per the 
dual-attitudes model proposed by Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler (2000), these system 2 
processes largely result in conscious or deliberate behaviour. As such, explicit self-esteem was 
investigated. 
1.9.1 Explicit self-esteem. Explicit self-esteem can be conceptualised as the conscious 
or verbal attitudes, feelings and beliefs that one holds in regard to one’s self-worth (Jordan et 
al, 2003). Rosenberg (1965) developed what has been to date the most widely recognised and 
used scale for the measurement of explicit self-esteem (Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 
1997; Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). The Rosenberg self-esteem scale’s (RSES) 
popularity has been accredited to a number of factors, such as its reliability, validity (Gray-
Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997; Robins et al., 2001), brevity, long history of use, and its 
ease of comprehension (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). Explicit measures are unfortunately prone to 
impression management from respondents. For accurate and unbiased data, respondents are 
required to answer honestly, carefully, and with a certain level of introspection (Toma, 2013).  
In spite of these potential limitations within explicit measures, the current study aimed 
to extend the literature on differences between explicit and implicit self-esteem research. As 
previously stated, explicit and implicit self-esteem measures are predicted to operate under 
different underlying processes (Bosson et al., 2000; Farnham et al., 1999). The current study 
proposes that both system 1 and system 2 pathways compete to determine behaviour. System 
1 processes are reflective of impulsive and unconscious behaviour, and therefore the current 




motivation. In contrast, system 2 processes are reflective of controlled and conscious 
behaviour. As such, the Rosenberg self-esteem scale was used to investigate the relationship 
between explicit self-esteem and goal motivation. The current study is including both self-
esteem measures for exploratory purposes in order to highlight the potential effects (if any) that 
these forms of self-esteem have on the relationship between goal motivation and self-control. 
 
1.10 Self-Control 
Dual-process models are also used to conceptualise the divergent relationship between 
self-control and impulsivity (Schelling, 1978; Ainslie, 1985). As stated above, impulsive 
behaviour is a function of system 1 processes, whereas self-control is a function of system 2 
processes. Self-control or self-regulation is understood as the capacity to control one’s inner 
responses and impulses (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). It has been referred to as 
among humankind’s most valuable assets (Meier, Reinecke & Meltzer, 2016). Past research 
has linked low self-control (impulsivity) to binge eating, alcohol abuse, poor emotional 
regulation, lower academic grades, lower self-esteem (Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone, 
2004), more unprotected sex, and higher addiction rates (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 
1994; Muraven, Tice, Baumeister, 1998). Self-control requires individuals to inhibit and 
override competing urges, behaviours and desires (Baumeister et al., 1994; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000). It belongs to a system of processes known as executive functions. Together, 
executive functions form the cognitive control system responsible for making decisions, 
initiating and attending to actions, and regulating the self (Baumeister, 1998; Vohs et al., 2008).  
Self-control plays a role in the setting of personal goals, and the navigation of 
behaviours towards said goals (Kuijer, 2016). Baumeister et al. (1994) reported that 




(Baumeister, 2014). Responsible inhibition is defined by three different processes. The first 
process involves the inhibition of an initial dominant response to an event, causing a delay in 
responding. The second process involves the interruption of a continuing response, thereby 
ceasing the pattern of responding. The third process involves inhibiting competing events, 
behaviour and stimuli from interfering with goal-directed behaviour (Barkley, 2001). 
Successful self-control is therefore integral for the performance and maintenance of goal-
directed behaviour.  
Self-control can be measured at both the trait and state level. Individual differences in 
self-control are observed at the trait level, whereas the expenditure of self-control resources 
results in short-term decreases at the state-level (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1998). In this sense, self-control resources are analogous to 
a commodity that can be expended for the performance of goal-directed behaviour. The current 
study looked to investigate the implementation of self-control to engage in superordinate goals 
(goals that affirm the self), versus the implementation of impulsivity to disengage from 
subordinate goals (goals that conflict with the self). The relationship between self-control and 
impulsivity has been personified as an internal contest for self-command between two forces, 
one myopic and one farsighted (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991).  
Impulsive individuals sacrifice larger long-term goals or rewards to pursue short-term 
goals or rewards. This behaviour is referred to as immediate gratification (Mischel, 1974; 
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). In contrast, delayed gratification is understood as a function 
of an individual’s ability to exhibit self-control when pursuing long-term goals or rewards 
(Mischel, 1974). Individuals seek delayed gratification through short-term sacrifice in 
exchange for long-term goals or rewards. Therefore, individuals who are not willing to sacrifice 




impulsively, or without self-control; however, the current study proposes that these individuals 
instead may disengage from subordinate goals as a self-protective measure against ego-threat, 
and as a self-preservation measure in order to cease the expenditure of resources towards goals 
that are not core to an individual’s self-identity. Goal motivation therefore determines goal 
engagement or disengagement. Through goal pursuit, individuals use their environment to 
satisfy their needs, and as per Ross and Nisbett (2011), their behaviour is the product of an 
interaction between the individual and their environment. 
 
1.11 Uses and Gratifications Theory  
Uses and gratifications theory (Katz et al., 1973) suggests that behaviour is driven by 
emotional, cognitive, social, and habitual needs that individuals satisfy and reduce through 
media usage (Rosen, Carrier, & Cheever, 2013). Hofmann et al. (2016) declared media use a 
“powerful source of intrinsic need satisfaction” (Reinecke et al., 2012). The psychological 
effects of media content such as social media largely depend on the reasons for the individual 
using it (Weiser, 2001). It is therefore imperative that media research continues to remain 
sensitive to the interaction between individuals and technology, which is perpetually evolving 
within the modern world. The current study chose to investigate online social media and 
academic print, as these two mediums provide an accurate exemplar of the two primary reasons 
for internet use, as adapted from research conducted by Weiser (2001). Social media and 
academic material can both be used to pursue goals, with the objective of satisfying an 
individual’s needs. It is however predicted that the psychological effects of social media and 
academic study will differ as a function of an individual’s self-esteem. Previous research on 




(Kirschner & Karpinski, 2010; Hassell & Sukalich, 2016), although these effects may be 
moderated by individual differences in self-esteem.  
1.11.1 Socio-affective regulation. Socio-affective regulation can be understood as the 
consumption of social and trivial information for the purposes of entertainment (Weiser, 2001). 
Socio-affective regulation is a means of regulating emotion through immediate social 
gratification (Weiser, 2001). It provides users with short-term satisfaction, a “feel-good” 
experience, akin to the sensation experienced by impulse shoppers, drug and alcohol users, and 
gamblers. Social media networks are a prime example of media content that provides socio-
affective regulation. Boyd (2007, p. 211) defined social media as “web‐based services that 
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi‐public profile within a bounded system, (2) 
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse 
their list of connections and those made by others within the system”. Facebook, the largest 
social media network, engages a total of 1.5 billion daily users, and 2.2 billion monthly users 
(Facebook, 2018). As per research conducted by Atchley and Warden (2012), by “offering an 
often-gratifying escape from ongoing tasks, engagement with e-devices may occupy basic 
reward-related processes and even impact the fundamental mechanisms through which we 
valuate and process rewards” (Wilmer & Chein, 2016, p. 1607).  
According to uses and gratifications theory, individuals may partake in socio-affective 
regulation as an escape from real-life, to relieve boredom, diminish loneliness, “pass the time”, 
or seek validity (LaRose, Lin, & Eastin, 2003), and research has found that LSE individuals 
use social media more than HSE individuals (Vogel et al., 2014). Social media may promote 
goal affirmation for LSE individuals due to the immediate validation that individuals receive 
when using it. Research conducted by Gentile, Twenge, Freeman, and Campbell (2012) found 




positive self-view. Similarly, Toma (2013) found that users experienced a significant boost in 
implicit state self-esteem after examining their Facebook profiles. Gonzales and Hancock 
(2011) also found evidence of increases to explicit self-esteem through social media use.  
Social support via Facebook actually serves as a stress buffer, as per the buffer 
hypothesis (Greenberg et al., 1992; Nabi, Prestin, & So, 2013). Vohs and Heatherton (2001) 
theorised that when LSE individuals are threatened, they respond by directing their attention 
to social reinforcement mechanisms such as positive feedback, reassurance and a dependency 
on others. It becomes a coping mechanism for LSE individuals to receive social support and 
wellbeing reparation following negative emotional experiences (Berger & Buechel, 2012). In 
a longitudinal study conducted by Steinfeld, Ellison and Lampe (2008) it was concluded that 
LSE participants gained more from Facebook use than HSE individuals in terms of bridging 
social capital. For LSE individuals, social media is more than just a mode of keeping in 
communication with distant relatives. Goals which are pursued for socio-affective regulation 
may be less demanding of resources and more immediately gratifying, thus appealing to the 
needs and capacity of LSE individuals. The current study proposes that HSE individuals do not 
directly pursue self-esteem (Kernis, 2003) and are not therefore motivated to pursue social 
media in order to diminish their psychological needs in the same way as LSE individuals. As 
such, social media is anticipated to promote goal conflict in HSE individuals, relative to the 
performance of academic study, due to the proposition that social media is incongruent with 




1.11.2 Goods-and-information acquisition. As per Weiser (2001), the alternative use 
for internet media is for the acquisition of goods and information. It is defined by its utilitarian 
approach to the accessing and sharing of content online (Weiser, 2001), and gratified through 
information mediums such as Google Scholar, Wikipedia, and online tutorials. Goods-and-
information content would be considered consistent with self-actualization or growth needs, as 
per Maslow’s (1970) expanded hierarchy of needs. Academic material is considered indicative 
of goods-and-information acquisition, particularly within the context of academia. It requires 
short-term sacrifice (akin to delayed gratification) and provides information that yields long-
term benefit (Weiser, 2001). Personal resources such as self-control are expended in the process 
of consuming academic material, in order to work towards LT goals such as passing academic 
examinations, or completing a qualification.  
The current study proposes that goods-and-information acquisition promotes 
goal affirmation for HSE individuals, by reinforcing goals in domains where they are both 
confident and motivated to achieve. HSE individuals are more adept at delaying gratification 
in regard to the pursuit of long-term goals (Duckworth & Seligman, 2005), such as goals that 
are facilitated through the acquisition of goods and information. Comparatively speaking, LSE 
individuals are anticipated to experience ego-threat from the pursuit of LT goals for the purpose 
of goods-and-information acquisition. This is predicted based on the premise that using online 
media to the pursue goods-and-information acquisition yields less immediate gratification in 
comparison with the consumption of online media for socio-affective regulation purposes. 
The expenditure of personal resources such as self-control on LT goals may be 
perceived as too large of a short-term sacrifice for LSE individuals, with not enough certainty 
for future reward. Take the following example of the potential ego threat that an LSE individual 
can experience when primed with academic material relevant to an upcoming exam. The 




the discrepancy between: (a) their and other students’ abilities and/or performance; (b) what 
they know and what they need to know prior to the exam; (c) their current affect and their 
predicted affect if they were to expend resources on studying and still fail. Therefore, I 
anticipate LSE individuals to be less motivated than HSE individuals to engage in content that 
provides goods-and-information acquisition, due to goal conflict.  
 
1.12 Current Research 
The aim of the current study is to establish the effects of participation in social media 
and academic study on self-control as a function of individual differences in implicit and 
explicit self-esteem. This will be done by having participants complete both explicit and 
implicit self-esteem measures pre-manipulation, followed by participation in either the social 
media, or academic study condition. State self-control will be measured post-manipulation 
through tasks that require response inhibition.  
 
1.13 Hypotheses and Research Aims 
Hypothesis 1 – Participants with LSE will exhibit less self-control when 
performing cognitive activities following participation in an academic study task than 
with participation in a social media task. 
Individuals are motivated to approach situations that are congruent with their goal 
schema and to avoid situations which are incongruent. The academic study condition is 
considered a task non-congruent with an LSE individual’s proximal goal schema. This is due 
to LSE individuals having less confidence in their ability to successfully pursue LT goals such 
as academic success, and also due to these goals competing for resources with the superordinate 




regulation). Consequently, LT goals promote ego threat for LSE individuals due to the negative 
consequences that failure could have on their self-worth. Moreover, these goals do not provide 
the immediately gratifying self-esteem boost that LSE individuals seek from stimuli within 
their environment. LSE individuals will therefore be motived to disengage from environmental 
stimuli that elucidate goal conflict. It is predicted that LSE individuals will subsequently adopt 
avoidance motivation strategies when primed with the academic study condition. I hypothesise 
that, as a result, LSE individuals will show signs of sub-optimal self-control performance 
during the post-manipulation cognitive tasks (i.e., impulsive behaviour when responding). 
 
Hypothesis 2 – Participants with HSE will exhibit lower levels of self-control when 
performing cognitive activities following participation in a social media task than with 
participation in an academic study task. 
An HSE individual’s goal schema is structured around the fulfilment of high-order 
needs that provide purpose and self-fulfilment. Research done by Sagioglou and Greitmeyer 
(2014) concluded that Facebook has a negative impact on affective well-being due to being 
less useful, less meaningful, and a bigger time-waste in comparison with other online activities. 
I hypothesise that HSE individuals will be less motivated than LSE individuals to attend to 
social media content as it does not predict success at LT goals. A primary function of social 
media content is that it provides users with a means to pursue socio-affective regulation. This 
content is predicted to elucidate goal conflict in HSE individuals. HSE individuals’ self-esteem 
is more stable, and less contingent on constant acceptance and immediate gratification (Kernis, 
2003), and therefore these individuals see less benefit in devoting resources to emotion 
regulation. This is not to say that HSE individuals cannot perform and enjoy behaviour that 




to diminish self-esteem needs through socio-affective regulation. Therefore, the ritual of social 
media performance may present itself as a subordinate goal to HSE individuals. The elucidation 
of goal conflict is predicted to result in diminished motivation to exert resources on tasks 
relating to subordinate goals. Subsequently, I theorise that following the performance of social 
media, HSE individuals will not be motivated to excite controlled behaviour on self-control 







Participants who completed the current study were 231 undergraduate psychology 
students enrolled in a first-year psychology course, Brain, Behaviour, and Cognition. 
Participants were recruited through the University of Canterbury’s psychology department 
participant pool. Data from 16 participants were omitted for the following reasons: (a) 
Participants who were randomly assigned to the social media condition but did not possess a 
social media account (n = 6); (b) participants who failed to complete all aspects of the study 
(n = 4); (c) those that made too many errors according to Greenwald, Nosek and Banaji’s 
(2003) IAT algorithm (n = 6). Therefore, 215 participants were included in the final data 
analysis. This sample included 49 males and 166 females (78.6% of participants were aged 17 
to 20 years).  
The final sample consisted of 104 participants in the social media condition, and 111 
participants in the academic study condition. The sample was predominantly participants of a 
New Zealand European background (82.8% self-identified as New Zealand European or 
Pakeha, 14.4% as Māori, 8.4% as Asian, 3.3% as Pacific Islander, 1.4% as African, 0.9% as 
Filipino, 0.5% as Peruvian, 0.5% as British, 0.5% as Dutch, 0.5% as Indian, 0.5% as South 
African, and 0.5% as Singaporean Indian). It should be noted that some participants reported 
identifying with two or more of the above ethnicities, and were therefore counted in multiple 
racial categories. Moreover, 90.7% of the sample population reported to be New Zealand 
citizens, and 92.1% reported English as their first language The sample population comprised 
a diverse range of socio-economic statuses, with participants rating themselves on a scale of 1 




socio-economically relative to other people in their community (mean = 5.88, SD = 1.7). Lastly, 
85.1% of the sample population reported to being right-handed.  
 
2.2 Materials 
 Condition manipulation.  
2.2.1.1 Academic study. Participants were provided with study material content from 
“Psychology” (Schacter et al., 2015), the assigned course textbook for the Introductory 
Psychology paper (PSYC 105) that all participants were enrolled in. Participants were provided 
with 12 A4-sized colour page copies from the chapter “Neuroscience and Behaviour” (Schacter 
et al., 2015) as this was a unit all participants were required to learn for an upcoming test. 
Participants were provided with this material as it was reflective of a LT goal relevant to all 
participants. Participants were advised that the material provided to them would be relevant to 
this examination and were advised to interact with the content as they typically would when 
studying for an exam. Participants were advised that they would be asked questions on the 
academic study condition at the end of the experiment, and to therefore use the time 
productively. Participants were provided with the study materials and then each was timed 
individually. Participants were instructed to keep studying until a research assistant advised 
them on the next section of the study. Once a participant had completed 15 minutes, the study 
materials were removed from the participant and they were directed to the dependent variable 
(Go/No-Go task). Participants at no time knew of a condition other than the one they were in.  
2.2.1.2 Social media. Participants were provided with a computer monitor with access 
to the Internet. Participants were advised to use the computer to access their own personal 
social media accounts (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Tumblr) and interact with the content as 




social media accounts if they had access credentials to these accounts. The research assistant 
advised participants that they were, however, prohibited from using any instant messaging 
format on their chosen social media accounts. Participants were advised that they would be 
asked questions at the end of the experiment about their time spent performing the condition. 
Participants were individually provided with instruction on when to start, and then each was 
timed individually. Participants were instructed to keep at the task until a research assistant 
advised them to stop. Once a participant had completed 15 minutes, the study materials were 
removed from the participant who was directed on to the Go/No-Go task. Participants at no 
time knew of a condition other than the one they were in. 
 
2.3 Pre-measures 
2.3.1 Demographic measures. All participants initially completed a series of pre-
measures including demographics such as age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, 
primary language spoken, and handedness (refer to Appendix B, Figure 2). 
2.3.2 Explicit self-esteem measure. Explicit self-esteem was measured using the 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965). Participants rated their self-esteem on the 
10-item Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale using items such as: I take a positive attitude 
toward myself and I feel I do not have much to be proud of (reversed; refer to Appendix C, 
Figure 3). The questionnaire was scored using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 
2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s α for 
the current study was .92, indicating acceptable internal consistency of the explicit self-esteem 
questionnaire. 
2.3.3 Implicit self-esteem measure. Implicit self-esteem was measured using a self-




created and presented using Inquisit software version 5.0.4 (Millisecond, 2016), and followed 
the procedure described by Greenwald and Farnham (2000). The IAT measures how fast 
subjects can make an association categorising self-items with pleasant items, in comparison 
with non-self-items (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Category labels on the left side of the 
screen are represented by the left key e and category labels on the right side of the screen are 
represented by the right key i (refer to Appendix D, Figure 4). Participants are instructed to 
rapidly classify stimuli based on which category (left or right) they associate the stimuli with. 
Stimuli are presented on the screen until the participant makes the correct response, at which 
point the next trial begins. The self-esteem IAT consists of different blocks, where participants’ 
associations between pleasant and unpleasant words are paired with attributes to the self or 
others. For example, if participants responded faster (with accuracy) to an association between 
the self and positive words such as smile and happy, than to negative words such as agony and 
gloom, then it could be attributed to a stronger implicit association for positive attitudes to the 
self, in comparison with others (see Figure 1). Moreover, faster responses (with accuracy) to 
negative attributes towards others (non-self), in comparison with the self may also imply a 
negative view of others, in comparison with the self. Participants performed a total of 160 trials 
throughout the different blocks, including a sum of 80 practice and 80 critical trials. The 
procedural steps were counterbalanced to control for order effects (Greenwald et al., 1998). 
2.3.4 Trait self-control. A 36-item questionnaire was used to investigate trait self-
control (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). The questionnaire was scored using a five-
point Likert scale (1 = very rarely, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = very often) and 
included items such as people would describe me as impulsive (reversed; refer to Appendix E, 
Figure 4). Cronbach’s α was .89, indicating acceptable internal consistency of the trait self-




2.3.5 Go/No-Go task. The Go/No-Go task was used to measure state self-control via 
the inhibition of responses to on-screen stimuli. The Go/No-Go task was designed and 
presented using E-Prime 3.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 2016). It was implemented 
due to its strong history as a reliable measure for self-control (Simmonds, Pekar & Mostofsky, 
2008). At the start of the task, participants were instructed to sit facing their computer monitor, 
with their keyboard directly in front of them, at an accessible distance from their body. 
Participants were advised to adjust their seat positioning so that they were comfortable to 
respond via operation of the keyboard to stimuli presented on the computer monitor. 
Participants were provided with on-screen instructions regarding the objectives and rules of the 
task. The task consisted of 280 trials that ran consecutively. The trials consisted of four 
different target stimuli, (go stimuli, no-go stimuli, prime stimuli and distractor stimuli; refer to 
Appendix F, Figures 6-8). The target stimuli were presented in 70 point Times New Roman 
font in white, in the middle of a black screen. Stimuli were presented for a period of 320 ms, 
and each target stimulus was followed by a 1000 ms inter-trial interval. Participants were 
advised that target stimuli would be presented in a random sequence continuously in the centre 
of the screen. Participants were advised that following the presentation of the letter k (go 
stimulus) they were to respond by pressing the letter o on the keyboard, but only on trials where 
the go stimulus had been preceded by the letter n (prime stimulus). Trials where the prime 
stimulus was not succeeded by the go stimulus were classified as no-go stimuli trials and 
required no response. Each participant performed 14 practice block trials, and 260 main block 
trials. Within the main block trial, each participant performed 100 distractor trials, 100 go trials 
and 60 no-go trials. Responding via pressing the letter o was only required on go trials. 
Subsequently, any responding on distractor trials, prime trials, and no-go trials was referred to 
as a commission error, and was sub-optimal performance. Therefore accuracy, but not response 




performance, and therefore both accuracy and response times were recorded for these particular 
trials. Failure to respond to go trials by not pressing letter o is referred to an omission error, 
and considered sub-optimal performance. 
 
2.4 Design 
The independent variable manipulated in this study was the social media (N = 115) and 
academic study (N = 116) conditions. The dependent variable measured response inhibition by 
recording the response times and accuracy to responses on the cued Go/No-Go task (Fillmore, 
2003). The moderator variables measured explicit and implicit self-esteem respectively. The 
study took approximately 70 to 90 minutes to complete, and participants were given course 
credit for participation. All procedures were approved by the Human Ethics Committee at the 
University of Canterbury (refer to Appendix G). Data were collected over a series of 
experimental setting sessions through Semester One of the 2018 academic year. 
 
2.5 Procedure 
  Participants enrolled voluntarily for a study titled “The Internet, Personality, and your 
Behaviour”. The study was described as being focused on the relationship between personality, 
and how its relationship with information and technology can influence behaviour. 
Furthermore, it was stated that the prerequisites for the study included participants who had 
basic experience using the Internet, and were currently enrolled in the PSYC 105 course. 
Participants were not provided any further information prior to attending the study.  
The experiment was conducted in a single computer laboratory. The room contained a 
grid of six rows of computers, with five to six computers in each row. Each row alternated the 




the experiment. Each desk was separated by a partition and each cubicle contained a computer, 
keyboard and seat. Upon entering the room, participants were advised by a research assistant 
where they were to be seated. All participants were seated in an alternating fashion where no 
two neighbouring computers were occupied.  
Participants were briefed on the outline of the experiment, and subsequently advised to 
remain seated and not interact with any personal belongings (mobile phones, MP3s, laptop 
computers) or other participants for the duration of the study. Furthermore, participants were 
advised that the laboratory computers were only to be used for the purposes of the experiment. 
Participants were advised that the study was divided into three phases, at which point they were 
given a brief outline of what each phase would entail (refer to Appendix H).  Participants were 
asked for written and verbal consent prior to the study commencing (refer to Appendix I). Each 
participant was provided with a unique code in order to protect their anonymity. Participants 
entered this code at the beginning of every task throughout the study, under the supervision of 
a research assistant. Participants were advised that their participation was voluntary, and they 
could leave at any time if they so wished.  
2.5.1 Phase 1: Following consent, participants completed a battery of demographic and 
personality measures. These measures were presented and recorded online using Qualtrics 
Research Suite software (Version 57,005; 2014). Following completion of the questionnaires, 
participants were directed to a link for the self-esteem IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) where they 
were provided with on-screen instructions on how to perform the task. All data were presented 
and recorded online using Inquisit software (Version 5.0.4; Millisecond, 2016). Participants 
were then advised phase 1 had been completed, and they were now commencing phase 2 
(condition manipulation), which they were advised to use as a “refocus period” between phases 




2.5.2 Phase 2: Participants were provided both verbal and written instructions on 
expectations during the condition manipulation (performance of social media/academic study). 
A research assistant was present at all times to assist participants with any queries or concerns. 
Upon completion of their assigned condition, participants were prompted to return the study 
materials supplied to them in the academic study condition; whereas participants in the social 
media condition were prompted to log out of all social media accounts. Each participant was 
provided with individual assistance with the completion and commencement of each separate 
phase of the experiment to ensure all participants followed the same process. 
2.5.3 Phase 3: Following completion of phase 2, participants were advised they would 
be playing an online game. The games consisted of the cued Go/No-Go task. All data was 
presented and recorded using E-Prime 3.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 2016). 
Instructions for the task were given on screen. Upon completion, participants were provided 
with a post-assessment self-report questionnaire (refer to Appendices J & K) in order to 
ascertain whether participants were aware of the purpose of the study, and also for participants 
to rate how they felt during and post-manipulation. Participants were also able to provide 
feedback on questions such as sometimes I just clicked random responses in order to get 
through this study as quickly as possible and I found the instructions hard to understand. The 
questionnaire was scored using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = 
neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). Participants submitted the post-
assessment questionnaire with their unique code and were subsequently provided with a 
debriefing form prior to leaving (refer to Appendix L). All data were collected for each 






Data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 25.0 and Microsoft Excel 
Version 2010. The multiple regression analyses reported below used the PROCESS macro 
(Hayes, 2017) for computing all interaction effects and conditional indirect effects in moderator 
models.  
 
3.1 Implicit Self-Esteem Scores 
IAT-D scores were calculated following the procedures outlined in Greenwald et al. 
(2003). An individual’s implicit self-esteem score was calculated to create an IAT-D  score, 
where any IAT-D score larger than 0.0 would suggest that the respondent had a bias for more 
positive associations towards the self in comparison with others; however, a negative score 
would suggest more positive implicit associations towards others compared with the self. IAT-
D scores for the current study ranged from −0.79 to 1.82 (M = 0.66, SD = 0.46) suggesting that, 
on average, participants had positive self-regard at the implicit level. 
Implicit self-esteem was controlled for during statistical analyses as specified. This was 
performed by taking into account individual differences in implicit self-esteem, and separating 
these confounding effects from the relationship between explicit self-esteem, goal motivation 
and state self-control. 
 
3.2 Explicit Self-Esteem scores 
Responses collected from the Rosenberg self-esteem scale were used to measure 
explicit self-esteem. Each question was coded and scored from 1 to 5, with lower scores 
reflecting lower self-esteem. Scores for each question were added together, giving each 




esteem scores for the current study ranged from 12 to 50 (M = 33.25, SD = 8.19), suggesting 
that, on average, participants had positive self-regard at the explicit level. No significant 
correlation was found between explicit and implicit self-esteem scores (r = .006, p = .93). 
Explicit self-esteem was controlled for during statistical analyses as specified. This was 
performed by taking into account individual differences in explicit self-esteem, and separating 
these confounding effects from the relationship between implicit self-esteem, goal motivation 
and state self-control. 
 
3.3 Trait Self-Control Scores 
Responses collected from Tangney, Baumeister and Boone’s (2004) self-control scale 
were used to measure trait self-control. Each question was coded and scored from 1 to 5, with 
lower scores reflecting lower trait self-control. Scores for each scale item were added together, 
and this was averaged by the number of scale items to provide a mean self-control score for 
each participant (possible score range is 1 to 5). Trait self-control scores for the current study 
ranged from 1.53 to 4.44 (M = 3.08, SD = 0.47) with skewness of 0.02 (SE = 0.17), suggesting 
that participants’ self-control scores were normally distributed.  
Trait self-control was controlled for during statistical analyses as specified. This was 
performed by taking into account individual differences in trait self-control, and separating 
these confounding effects from the relationship between self-esteem (implicit, explicit), goal 





3.4 State Self-Control Scores 
Data collected from the no-go trials of the Go/No-Go task were used to measure 
response inhibition (state self-control). Response times were recorded in milliseconds (ms) and 
accuracy was recorded as a decimal, i.e. 80% of trials responded correctly = .8 accuracy score. 
Results were aggregated for each participant across no-go trials.  
 
3.5 Statistical Analyses (N = 215) 
3.5.1 Explicit self-esteem. Multiple regression analyses with 5,000 bias-corrected 
bootstrapped resamples were computed to investigate the interactive effects of explicit self-
esteem and condition on response accuracy to no-go trials (i.e., self-control). No significant 
interaction effects (Explicit Self-Esteem × Goal Motivation) were found, F(1, 211) = .089, 
p =.766, R² change < .001. 
These analyses were run again while controlling firstly for trait self-control, and 
secondly for implicit self-esteem. However, no significant interaction (Explicit Self-Esteem × 
Goal Motivation) emerged when controlling for trait self-control F(1, 210) = .259, p = .611, 
R² change < .001, or implicit self-esteem F(1, 210) = .072, p = .789, R² change < .001. 
3.5.2 Implicit Self-Esteem. Multiple regression analyses with 5,000 bias-corrected 
bootstrapped resamples were next computed to investigate the interactive effects of implicit 
self-esteem and condition on response accuracy to no-go trials (i.e., self-control). The model 
showed a significant interaction effect (Implicit Self-Esteem × Goal Motivation), 





Graph 1. Relationship between media condition and accuracy of responses to no-go 
trials as moderated by implicit self-esteem 
 
The Johnson-Neyman technique was then used for calculating the levels of implicit 
self-esteem at which there were significant differences between academic study and social 
media conditions. Using the Johnson–Neyman technique, it was found that for participants 
with an IAT-D score ≤ 0.034, participants in the academic study condition showed significantly 
less self-control than those in the social media condition. This means that for participants in 
the bottom 12.56th percentile of implicit self-esteem scores, low implicit self-esteem 
significantly moderated the relationship between goal motivation and self-control scores (for 
further details refer to Appendix M, Table 1). This finding supports hypothesis (1) by providing 
evidence that low implicit self-esteem individuals performed with less accuracy on no-go trials 
after performing the academic study condition than those in the social media condition. 
Furthermore, the Johnson–Neyman technique showed that for participants with an IAT-
D score ≥ 0.989, participants in the social media condition showed significantly less self-
control than those in the academic study condition. This means that for participants in the top 





































moderated the relationship between goal motivation and self-control scores (for further details 
refer to Appendix M, Table 1).The above analysis supports hypothesis (2) by providing 
evidence that high implicit self-esteem individuals performed with less accuracy on no-go trials 
after performing the social media condition than those in the academic study condition. 
These analyses were run again while controlling firstly for trait self-control, and 
secondly for implicit self-esteem. A significant interaction effect (Implicit Self-Esteem × 
Condition Manipulation) was still present after controlling for trait self-control, 
F(1, 210) = 7.797, p = .006, R² change = .035. Furthermore, controlling for explicit self-esteem 
did not alter this effect of Implicit Self-Esteem × Condition on Self-Control, F(1, 210) = 7.259, 
p = .008, R² change = .033.  
 
3.6 Further data cleaning 
A secondary set of statistical analyses were run using more stringent cut-off parameters 
for the exclusion of data for hypothesis testing. Exclusion parameters were set to remove 
participants who failed to act within the best interests of the study. This was performed to 
remove any potential bias from the dataset of participants who self-reported as responding 
inattentively.  
As a result, data was omitted for participants who self-reported in the post-assessment 
questionnaire that they either agree or strongly agree with the statement I sometimes just 
clicked random responses in order to get through this study as quickly as possible (n = 8); for 
participants who self-reported that they strongly agree with the statement I found the 
instructions hard to understand (n = 1); and for participants who self-reported that they 
strongly disagree with the statement I gave this study my undivided attention (n = 1).  Following 




statistical analyses were repeated to ascertain if the hypotheses would still be confirmed with 
stricter data exclusionary parameters. 
 
3.7 Statistical Analyses for Stricter Exclusionary Data Parameters (N = 205) 
3.7.1 Explicit Self-Esteem. Multiple regression analyses with 5,000 bias-corrected 
bootstrapped resamples were computed to investigate the effects of explicit self-esteem as a 
moderator variable on the relationship between condition and response accuracy to no-go trials. 
No significant interaction effects (Explicit Self-Esteem × Goal Motivation) were found, 
F(1, 201) = .067, p = .796. R² change < .001. 
These analyses were run again while controlling firstly for trait self-control, and 
secondly for implicit self-esteem; however, no significant interaction (Explicit Self-Esteem × 
Goal Motivation) emerged when controlling for trait self-control F(1, 200) = .153, p = .696, 
R² change = .001, or implicit self-esteem F(1, 200) = .053, p = .818, R² change < .001. 
3.7.2 Implicit Self-Esteem. Multiple regression analyses with 5,000 bias-corrected 
bootstrapped resamples were next computed to investigate the effects of implicit self-esteem 
as a moderator variable on the relationship between condition and response accuracy to no-go 
trials for exclusionary dataset parameters 2. The model showed a significant interaction effect 
(Implicit Self-Esteem × Goal Motivation), F(1, 201) = 6.947, p = .009, R² change = .033 (refer 




Graph 2. Relationship between media condition and accuracy of responses to no-go 
trials as moderated by implicit self-esteem 
 
Using this model, analyses were run using the Johnson–Neyman technique. The 
Johnson–Neyman technique found that for participants with an IAT-D score ≤ 0.046, 
participants in the academic study condition showed significantly less self-control than those 
in the social media condition. This means that for participants in the bottom 12.68th percentile 
of implicit self-esteem scores, low implicit self-esteem significantly moderated the relationship 
between goal motivation and self-control scores (see Appendix N, Table 2). This finding 
supports hypothesis (1) by providing evidence that low implicit self-esteem individuals 
performed with less accuracy on no-go trials after performing the academic study condition 
than those with the social media condition. 
Furthermore, the Johnson–Neyman technique showed that for participants with an 
IAT- D score ≥ 1.035, participants in the social media condition showed significantly less self-
control than those in the academic study condition. This means that for participants in the top 
19.51th percentile of implicit self-esteem scores, high implicit self-esteem significantly 
moderated the relationship between goal motivation and self-control scores (see Appendix N, 




































esteem individuals performed with less accuracy on no-go trials after performing the social 
media condition than those with the academic study condition. 
These analyses were run again while controlling firstly for trait self-control and 
secondly for explicit self-esteem. A significant interaction effect (Implicit Self-Esteem × 
Condition Manipulation) was still present after controlling for trait self-control, 
F(1, 200) = 7.576, p = .007, R² change = .036. Furthermore, controlling for explicit self-esteem 
also consistently yielded a significant interaction term F(1, 200) =1.869, p = .008, 






4 General Discussion 
The current research sought to extend the literature on the effects of goal motivation on 
self-control, as a function of differences in self-esteem. Specifically, I wanted to explore 
whether this relationship was facilitated through explicit or implicit self-esteem processes. This 
was examined by measuring participants’ self-control performance on cognitive activities, 
following engagement in either social media or academic study conditions for a period of 15 
minutes. These conditions were selected based on research into uses and gratifications theory 
(Katz et al., 1973; Weiser, 2001), which proposes that individuals use media consumption in 
order to satisfy and reduce social, emotional, cognitive, and habitual needs (Rosen, Carrier, & 
Cheever, 2013). State self-control was assessed through accuracy of response inhibition to 
trials on a cued Go/No-Go task. Self-esteem was measured through explicit and implicit 
measures. The current study found implicit self-esteem (automatic or unconscious feelings 
towards oneself) significantly moderated the effects of goal motivation (the performance of 
social media versus academic study) on self-control. In comparison, explicit self-esteem 
(explicit or deliberate feelings towards oneself) had no significant effect on self-control, 
following participation in social media versus academic study. 
The findings support hypothesis 1 predictions that LSE individuals who performed 
academic study showed more impulsivity on self-control tasks than LSE participants who 
performed social media. This suggests that priming LSE individuals with stimuli that promote 
goal conflict (i.e., academic study) results in more impulsive behaviour on subsequent 
unrelated tasks, in comparison with stimuli that promotes goal affirmation (social media). LSE 
individuals are less motivated to engage in environments that promote self-fulfilment needs 
through goods-and-information acquisition, than in environments that fulfil self-esteem needs 




al. (2017), Tice and Bratslavsky (2000), and Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister (2001), who 
found that people give precedence to the ST goal of affect regulation over other self-regulatory 
goals when threatened, by engaging in impulsive behaviours as a means of making themselves 
feel better.  
As predicted in hypothesis 2, HSE individuals who performed social media showed 
more impulsivity on self-control tasks than HSE participants in the academic study condition. 
These results suggest that priming HSE individuals with stimuli that promote goal conflict (i.e., 
social media) results in more impulsive behaviour on subsequent unrelated tasks in comparison 
with stimuli that promote goal affirmation (academic study). HSE individuals are less 
motivated to engage in environments that promote self-esteem needs through socio-affective 
regulation than in environments that satisfy self-fulfilment needs through goods-and-
information acquisition. The results provide support for Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1943, 
1954, 1970), reinforcing the theory that needs are hierarchically structured in terms of 
importance, and that this structure may therefore influence an individual’s motives. As stated 
by Kernis (2003), HSE individuals do not truly seek out behaviour to directly increase or 
maintain self-esteem. As a consequence, the needs that HSE individuals satisfy through social 
media use do not carry the same importance within their goal schema, and so HSE individuals 
receive less benefit from pursuing social media for socio-affective regulation purposes in 
comparison to LSE individuals. A decline in self-control may reflect decreased motivation to 
engage in goal-directed behaviour pertaining to that task (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). I 
therefore propose from the current findings that HSE individuals were less motivated to engage 
in social media, and as a result exhibited sub-optimal self-control. 
The current findings reflect that individuals can hold conflicting conscious and 




support for the dual-attitudes model perspective (Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000), 
proposing that two related yet divergent systems determine behaviour as a product of implicit 
and explicit processes. These results also provide support that implicit self-esteem operates 
through system 1 (hot, fast, reactive, impulsive) processes (Jordan et al., 2003). Because self-
esteem has strong consequences over emotion, the maintenance of self-esteem is 
predominantly controlled by system 1. This pathway is responsible for facilitating implicit or 
unconscious behaviour (Houben & Wiers, 2009). Activation of this hot, emotional system leads 
to automatic or reflexive responses (Crocker & Park, 2004) such as the impulsive responses 
emitted by individuals on the Go/No-Go task, following the elucidation of goal conflict.  
An individual’s unconscious or implicit thoughts, attitudes and beliefs can determine 
impulsive behaviour under environments that promote threat to the self. Because impulsive 
responding largely occurs unconsciously, implicit processes govern the performance of 
impulsive behaviour (Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). It can be reasoned, therefore, that 
impulsive responding is considered a mechanism of system 1 pathways, and that individuals’ 
act under command of these processes when experiencing threat to the self. By acting under 
command of system 1 processes when faced with goal conflict, individuals may not be 
explicitly or consciously aware of any changes in their behaviour. The current findings suggest 
that individuals’ behaviour can be determined by thoughts, attitudes and beliefs which they 
hold unconsciously or without deliberation. Therefore, implicit measures may be more 
sensitive than explicit measures when investigating an individual’s motives towards the pursuit 





4.1 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
As the ubiquity of digital media continues to grow, the outreach of social media 
continues to seep in to our everyday lives. Portable devices such as mobile phones, tablets and 
laptops provide users with unlimited access to an endless stream of entertainment and 
interaction. As a result, users find difficulty in juggling the short-term pleasures provided from 
media use, with the repercussions that this media use has on their LT goals (Hofmann, Reinecke 
& Meier, 2016). Online media is an ever-evolving cyborg and it is imperative that the field of 
social psychology continues to work closely with cyber-psychology in an effort to investigate 
the psychological effects that these media formats have on individuals. 
Much of the research conducted on social media has looked at dissecting its’ 
performance ritual into many discrete elements. Past literature has focused on how Facebook 
users respond to their own profiles versus the presentation of others (Gonzales & Hancock, 
2011); negative versus positive feedback received online (Valkenburg, Peter, & Schouten, 
2006); upward versus downward online social comparisons (Vogel et al, 2014); and close 
versus distant online friends (Wilcox & Stephen, 2012). The current study instead looked to 
capture the phenomena of the consumption of both academic material and social media, using 
the least invasive approach possible. As such, participants in both conditions were not given 
direction on how they should utilise the content (social media and academic study materials) 
during the condition. This was in the hopes of participants’ interacting with the content in a 
way that best mimics how academic material and social media content is consumed in a 
personal setting. The aim of this study was to provide participants with the holistic experience 
that consumers of both social media and academic study regularly contend with.  
As self-control was significantly predicted by an interaction between implicit self-




behaviours that individuals were not conscious of. It is important for individuals to be cognisant 
of what motivates them to approach and avoid certain goals within their environment. The 
implications of these results may extend as an explanation for impulsive responding in 
environments that do not affirm an individual’s proximal goal schema. For LSE individuals, 
the current findings could have implications which extend in to education settings based on 
their need for immediate social gratification. Learning could be structured for LSE individuals 
to endorse a reward schedule around this need for constant gratification by implementing 
positive reinforcement in short-term increments as progress is made. These individuals could 
look to break down LT goals by chunking, breaking down a difficult goal into manageable 
chunks. Incentives such as feedback from friends, family, teachers, coaches, and bosses may 
work to provide social gratification.  
Moreover, LSE individuals could look to implement self-affirmation practices, prior to 
taking on potentially ego-threatening tasks. This supports the work of Steele et al. (1993), who 
found that HSE individuals have greater affirmational resources and are subsequently more 
resilient to threats than LSE individuals (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). In fact, the intersection 
between self-affirmation and self-esteem is not novel to social psychology. Tesser (2000) 
reasoned that self-affirmation and self-esteem maintenance processes were interchangeable 
(Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Individuals can practise self-affirmation by thinking about or 
engaging in acts that empower their self-identity. Examples of this could be checking the sports 
results for a favourite team, researching a personal political ideology, thinking about family, a 
favourite hobby, or favourite band. By focusing on domains that individuals are good at and/or 
passionate about, this acts as a boost to the ego, similar to the effects of social media. If LSE 
individuals were made aware of the driving forces that compel their social media use, they 




As demonstrated during the study, goal conflict is experienced by both HSE and LSE 
individuals. The current research sheds light on differences in goal motivation as a function of 
implicit self-esteem. While these findings may not eliminate goal conflict, it may allow 
individuals to be mindful of their behaviour in the presence of threatening stimuli, in an effort 
to diminish impulsivity. Individuals’ awareness of impulsivity and its triggers could have a 
profound positive impact on unhealthy behaviours such as smoking, overeating, and unsafe sex 
(Moffitt et al., 2011).  
 
4.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Despite the findings of the current study and their implications for both self-esteem and 
self-control, we must first consider possible methodological limitations. Firstly, the sample 
consisted of students enrolled in a first-year psychology paper at the University of Canterbury. 
Furthermore, 75.8% of the sample population reported as female, 82.8% identified as New 
Zealand European, and 78.2% of the population reported to being aged 17 to 20. These sample 
parameters limit the ability to generalise the results to a wider population. Furthermore, it is 
possible that first year psychology undergraduates provide a certain response bias due to a basic 
knowledge and understanding of how psychology research is conducted. In order to try to 
eliminate this bias, the inclusion of implicit self-esteem measurement through the use of the 
IAT was implemented.  
The current findings showed that only participants who ranged in the bottom ~12th 
percentile of IAT-D scores showed significantly less self-control in the academic study than 
those in the social media condition. Due to positively skewed implicit self-esteem scores within 
the sample population, LSE in the current study was classified as IAT-D scores ranging 




more neutral implicit self-esteem, rather than an example of extremely low implicit self-
esteem. These positively skewed implicit-self-esteem scores provide a plausible explanation 
for why moderately high implicit self-esteem scores had a significant relationship with goal 
motivation and self-control (refer to Appendices M & N), whereas in comparison, only low to 
extremely low implicit self-esteem scores predicted a significant relationship between goal 
motivation and self-control. Due to the sample population being composed of university 
students, the current sample may not accurately depict the full range of implicit self-esteem 
scores found in the general population. Future research could investigate using a sample of 
participants who have not pursued tertiary education, in order to explore possible differences 
between these two populations. 
Further critique of the current study should address the methodology failure to 
implement a control condition, therefore the results of the current study can only be reported 
in terms of a comparison between conditions, making it impossible to ascertain if social media 
led to an increase in self-control, or if academic study led to a self-control decrease amongst 
LSE individuals. No control condition was implemented because of an inability to define what 
a suitable control condition would look like. Social media was identified as a suitable condition 
as it satisfies media users’ need for socio-affective regulation, whereas academic study was 
selected as it provides its users with goods-and-information acquisition, as per the research 
conducted by Weiser (2001) into uses-and-gratifications theory. A control condition would 
need to have been unbiased towards both of these conditions, yet still maintain participant 
engagement.  
The current study selected two conditions (social media and academic study) based 
upon the social and psychological effects of Internet use, as per uses-and-gratifications research 




conditions that were highly representative of how the two primary functions of Internet use 
(socio-affective regulation and goods-and-information acquisition) could be best elicited in an 
experimental setting within a period of 15 minutes, in order to elucidate goal motivation. As 
this study was very much exploratory in nature, this time period was not based on previous 
research. Further research could investigate how goal motivation changes as a function of time 
spent performing a task. Participant activity during the performance of social media and 
academic study was not qualitatively recorded (i.e., the depth of engagement within social 
media or academic study). However, it is proposed that the mere presentation of the condition, 
and the expectation to participate in it would have had subsequent effects on goal motivation, 
irrespective of whether the participant was engaged for the full 15 minutes. Even simply 
scrolling through social media has been found to increase self-esteem momentarily (Gonzales 
& Hancock, 2011; Wilcox & Stephen, 2012).  
A critique of the current methodology should address that only one of the 
aforementioned conditions was performed “online”. During the academic study condition, 
physical copies of print media were distributed to participants rather than providing an online 
or digital alternative, as per the social media condition. Whilst both conditions could have 
logistically been performed online in order to qualify both as “online media”, the academic 
study content was provided as physical copies to participants in order to give research assistants 
greater control over how the content was managed. While all participants in both conditions 
were monitored throughout the experiment, the concern with providing the academic content 
online was the potential distractions that come with online access to study content. 
Unfortunately this factor could not be mitigated in the social media condition. This potentially 
provides an inconsistency between conditions that should be noted. It was reasoned, however, 




with material consumed for the function of goods-and-information acquisition and should 
therefore elicit the same behaviour from participants regardless of its “offline” presentation.  
During the social media condition, Facebook and Instagram were the only two social 
media applications that participants elected to use (Twitter and Tumblr were not elected for 
use). At the beginning of this condition, participants were advised to disable the direct 
messaging function available on these platforms. This was to prevent individuals from utilising 
social media purely for the chat function. I acknowledge that this is a large part of the appeal 
of social media platforms as it provides users with an instantaneous mode of communication 
to a wealth of contacts. However, this function of person-to-person messaging shares parallels 
with short message services (SMS). As such, it is predicted to fulfil different needs for users, 
as per the theoretical work of research conducted by Grellhesl and Punyanunt-Carter (2012) 
into uses-and-gratifications theory. Direct messaging provides users with immediate 
gratification, social inclusion, self-affirmation, and feelings of acceptance. However, as the 
content shared through direct messaging is limitless, the needs gratified by direct messaging 
are predicted to be a function of the meaning and intent of each discrete message. Future 
research could explore the differences between the short-term psychological effects of social 
media with and without the use of direct messaging platforms.  
 It would be disingenuous to not highlight other possible explanations for LSE 
individuals possessing a proclivity towards social media rather than academic study. In 
research comparing Twitter and Facebook conducted by Hughes et al. (2012), participants with 
a preference for Facebook rated themselves higher in sociability, extraversion and neuroticism, 
whereas participants with a preference for Twitter self-reported a higher need for cognition. It 
would be interesting to apply measures of sociability and need for cognition to the current study 




should look to explore the use of these other popular social media domains such as Twitter, 
Reddit, and Snapchat for comparative purposes as per Hughes et al. (2012).  
Alternatively, further research could also include more traditional media content 
mediums such as television-watching, or alternative digital media content mediums such as 
YouTube or Netflix. Picture-based mobile dating applications (PMDA) such as Tinder have 
continued to gain momentum as popular ways to interact and seek gratification. These 
applications consist primarily of an index of images of potential romantic matches, and a direct-
messaging service (Sumter, Vandenbosch, & Ligtenberg, 2017). Further studies could 
investigate goal motivation for online dating applications in comparison with the social media 
applications investigated in the current study. 
The current study consisted exclusively of university students enrolled in an 
undergraduate psychology paper. Because all of these individuals were able to reach tertiary 
education, this suggests that LSE has not inhibited their ability to pursue academic goals to a 
certain extent. It should therefore be considered that these individuals may have found coping 
mechanisms to deal with ego threat and/or goal conflict experienced as a result of LT goals, 
and therefore other factors that contribute to the relationship between goal motivation and 
diminished self-regulation need to be explored. Research conducted by Barrett, Tugade, and 
Engle (2004) proposed that individuals high in working memory capacity are more successful 
at performing self-regulatory processes in order to protect goal-directed activity from impulsive 
behaviour.  
Furthermore, the topics of self-esteem, self-control, academic study and social media 
use share much common ground in the literature with the behaviour of procrastination. 
Procrastination can serve an interesting cocktail of self-defeating, self-defensive, and integrity-




findings of the current study, I propose that research could explore the relationship between 
social media, procrastination and self-esteem. Factors like this could have a confounding 




In the current study, the hypothesis that implicit self-esteem moderates the relationship 
between goal motivation and self-control performance was supported. These findings endorse 
the notion that individuals are motivated to satisfy needs that are structured hierarchically, 
consistent with the work of Maslow (1943, 1954, 1970). The current study proposes that 
implicit self-esteem functions as a metaphorical score-counter for an individual’s experiences 
with acceptance and success across all the domains that constitute their self-system. Implicit 
self-esteem therefore plays a role in negotiating whether an individual therefore approaches or 
avoids a particular goal within their environment. I propose that two factors determine whether 
an individual will be motivated to approach or avoid goals within their environment.  
Firstly, an individual establishes whether their current environment can facilitate the 
pursuit of goals which satisfy their needs. Secondly, that individual needs to determine whether 
the benefits of successful goal pursuit will outweigh the costs of unsuccessful goal pursuit, as 
both outcomes will expend resources (such as self-control) in the process. If both of the above 
factors are met (the environment is congruent with an individual’s needs, and the goal does not 
pose a threat to the individual’s capacity), then affirmation of an individual’s superordinate 
goals will increase motivation to engage within their environment.  
However, when an individual’s current environment and superordinate goals conflict, 




motivation to disengage) within their environment. Increased motivation results in increased 
expenditure of resources within the environment (i.e., an increase in self-control/decrease in 
impulsivity), whereas decreased motivation results in decreased expenditure of resources 
within the environment (i.e., decrease in self-control/increase in impulsivity). As adapted from 
the workings of Crocker and Wolfe (2001), I suggest goal congruency is determined by goals 
and behaviour that fit an individuals’ goal schema. 
This proposed account of the current results provides support that mental (cognitive 
and emotional) resources are valued as a limited resource by the individual (The Two Systems, 
[web page] 2012; Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). Furthermore, through differences found in 
implicit versus explicit self-esteem processes, the current study reinforces dual-system theory 
research such the dual-attitudes model (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), reflective–
impulsive model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009), hot–cool system 
(Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999), cognitive-experiential self-theory (Epstein & Morling, 1995), 
and research on fast/system 1 versus slow/system 2 processes (Kahneman & Egan, 2011).  
In summary, the present thesis demonstrates that the presentation of academic study 
elucidates diminished self-control in individuals low in implicit self-esteem, in comparison 
with the presentation of social media. In contrast, the presentation of social media elucidates 
diminished self-control in individuals high in implicit self-esteem, in comparison with the 
presentation of academic study. The current study explains these findings as a result of an 
individual’s motivation to approach goals that affirm the self, and to avoid goals that promote 
conflict. These results may provide an account of why LSE individuals have a proclivity to 
seek social reinforcement from tools such as online social networks. This extends previous 
literature on self-esteem and self-control, with the intent of building on research being 
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Figure 2. Demographic Measures 
 
 
Ethnicity (check all that apply) 
NZ 
European 















Nationality or Citizenship 
NZ Citizen Other (please specify) 
 
 




What is your age? 
17-20 21 - 25 26 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 65 65+ 
 
 






What is your gender? 




Think of this ladder as showing where people stand in their communities. People define 
community in different ways. Please define it in whatever way is most meaningful to you. 
 
At the top of the ladder are the people who have the highest standing in their community. At 





Where would you place yourself on this ladder? 
 
Choose the number that best describes where you think you stand at this time of your life 
relative to other people in your community. 
10 – 
the top 










Figure 3. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) 
 
 
SE1 I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others 
SE2 I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
SE3 All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure 
SE4 I am able to do things as well as most other people 
SE5 I feel I do not have much to be proud of 
SE6 I take a positive attitude toward myself 
SE7 On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 
SE8 I wish I could have more respect for myself 
SE9 I certainly feel useless at times 




Response options: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 4 = 
Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree. 
 







Figure 4. The categorisation tasks in the IAT and examples of words used 
 
Category Labels Sample Items Category Labels   
 
Step 1: Practice block (20 trials) 
Other  Self 
 me ● 
● them  
 
Step 2: Practice block (20 trials) 
Pleasant  Unpleasant 
● joy  
 filth ● 
 
Step 3: Practice block (20 trials) 




 Unpleasant  
Or 
Self 
 filth ● 
● joy  
● them  
 me ● 
 
Step 4: Practice block (20 trials) 
Self  Other 
● me  
 them ● 
 
Step 5: Practice block (20 trials) 







 them ● 
● joy  
 filth ● 








Figure 5. Trait Self-Control scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004) 
SC1 I have a hard time breaking bad habits 
SC2 I am lazy. 
SC3 I say inappropriate things. 
SC4 I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun. 
SC5 I refuse things that are bad for me. 
SC6 I wish I had more self-discipline. 
SC7 I never allow myself to lose control. 
SC8 People would say that I have iron self-discipline. 
SC9 I have trouble concentrating. 
SC10 I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals. 
SC11 Sometimes I can't stop myself from doing something, even if I know it's 
wrong. 
SC12 I often act without thinking through all the alternatives. 
SC13 Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done. 
SC14 People can count on me to keep on schedule. 
SC15 Getting up in the morning is hard for me. 
SC16 I have trouble saying no. 
SC17 I change my mind fairly often. 
SC18 I blurt out whatever is on my mind. 
SC19 People would describe me as impulsive. 
SC20 I spend too much money. 
SC21 I keep everything neat. 
SC22 I am self-indulgent at times. 
SC23 I am reliable. 
SC24 I get carried away by my feelings. 
SC25 I do many things on the spur of the moment. 
SC26 I don't keep secrets very well. 
SC27 I have worked or studied all night at the last minute. 
SC28 I'm not easily discouraged. 
SC29 I'd be better off if I stopped to think before acting. 
SC30 I engage in healthy practices. 
SC31 I eat healthy foods. 
SC32 I lose my temper too easily. 
SC33 I often interrupt people. 
SC34 I sometimes drink or use drugs to excess. 
SC35 I am always on time. 









Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 36 were 











Figure 7. Go/No-Go trial example for go trials 
 
 
Figure 8. Go/No-Go task example for no-go trials 
  
Distractor Stimuli b, c, d, f, g, h, j, k, m, o, p 
Prime stimuli n 
Go stimuli:  k 












Participant Information Sheet 
(As copied from the online link accessed by participants) 
 
Study Name: Internet, Personality and Behaviour study 
 
Researchers:    
Dr Kyle Nash, Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury                     
Dr Kumar Yogeeswaran, Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury 
Matthew Johnston, Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury 
  
Purpose of Research? 
This ground-breaking research investigates patterns of relations among participants’ 
personality dispositions and personal orientations, experiences, preferences, and thought 
processes. It will add to international researchers’ growing understanding of how basic 
processes that underlie personality differences relate to important social phenomena. 
  
What Will You Be Asked To Do? 
In total, the study session will take 60 minutes to complete. There are multiple components of 
this study that are part of a larger subset. Several parts that you may be asked to complete are 
as follows: 
  
a)     Rate your personality on various questionnaires with items such as, “I am an active 
person” 
  
b)      Be asked demographic questions such as your age and gender. 
  
c)      Complete an exercise that requires you to focus for a period of 15 minutes with on-
screen directions. 
  
d)     Participate in 2 individual cognitive tasks which you will be asked to complete to the 






e)     Report on your experience in participating in this study. 
  
Risks and Discomforts: 
There are no obvious risks of participation in this research, but some of the questions may be 
challenging or may require that you reflect on aspects of yourself or life that you may be 
uncomfortable with. You are free to decline to respond to any such materials. 
  
Benefits of the Research and Benefits to You: 
This research may benefit society by contributing to a better understanding of personality 
processes that underlie people’s opinions, values, goals, preferences, and personalities, more 
generally. Ultimately, we hope that better scientific understanding of people’s different 
orientations will contribute to improvements in policies designed to help societies function 
more optimally and with less conflict.  
You may also derive personal benefit from participation in this research insofar as it may 
contribute to your having a more concrete understanding of the process of social science. 
Moreover, many of the questions involve self-reflection, and past participants have 
commented that they appreciated the opportunity to reflect on themselves and their lives. 
  
Voluntary Participation: 
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. Whether you decide to volunteer, or 
not, will not influence your relation with the researchers involved in the study, or with the 
University of Canterbury, either now, or in the future. 
  
Withdrawal from the Study: 
You can stop participating, or skip question or sections in the study at any time, for any 
reason, if you so decide. If you decide to stop participating, or to skip certain parts, you will 
still be eligible to receive the points for agreeing to be in the project. Your decision to stop 
participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with 
the researchers, the University, or any other group associated with this project. 
  
Confidentiality: 
All information you supply during the research will be held in confidence and your name will 
not appear in any report or publication of the research. Only research staff will have access to 
the data, and your name or other identifying information (such as your student number or 





Questions about the Research: 
If you have questions about the research in general or about the role in the study, please feel 
free to contact Matthew Johnston (email matty.johnston@pg.canterbury.ac.nz). This research 
has been reviewed by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury (HEC). 
If you have any questions about this process or about your rights as a participant in the study, 
please contact the Chair of The Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury, 








 (As copied from the online link accessed by participants) 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
  
·         I have read and understood the description of the above-mentioned project. 
·         I understand that my participation will involve completing a confidential questionnaire, 
 if I agree to take part in the research. 
·         I understand that I am eligible for course credit (for PSYC105). 
·         I understand that participation is voluntary and I can withdraw from the study at any 
 time. 
·         I understand the data I have provided will be deleted after 5 years. 
·         I agree to publication of results, with the understanding that any information or  
 opinions I provide will be kept confidential. Also that any published or reported  
 results will not identify my name or personal information. 
·         I agree to follow instructions provided by the experimenter in order to ensure my own 
 safety. 
·         I understand that all data collected for the study will be kept in locked and secure  
 facilities and will be destroyed after five years. 
·         I am satisfied with all the measures that will be taken to protect my identity and ensure 
 that my interests are protected. 
·         I understand the risks associated with taking part and how they will be managed. 
·         I understand that I am able to receive a report on the findings of the study or further
 information by contacting the researcher at the conclusion of the project, Mr Matthew 
 Johnston, matty.johnston@pg.canterbury.ac.nz. 
·         If I have any complaints, I can contact the Chair of The Human Ethics Committee of 
 the University of Canterbury (HEC), Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human- 
 ethics@canterbury.ac.nz) 
 
By entering my initials below, I agree to participate in this research project and I indicate that 































Good      
Bad      
Friendly      
Unfriendly      
Angry      
Pleasant      
Happy      
Sad      
Smart      
Successful      
Likeable      
Meaningful      
Frustrated      
Confused      
Uncertain      
Empty      
Anxious      
Ashamed      
Insecure      
Lonely      
Stupid      




3) Thank you again for your time.  You are now reaching the end of the research study.  
Before you leave, we would like to explain to you in further detail what the study was 
about and what we expected to find. 
 
 







4) Out of the 15 minutes spent during the social media condition, how many of those 
minutes would you say you spend focused on that task? 
 
 












     
I gave this study 
my undivided 
attention 
     
I sometimes just 
clicked random 
responses in 
order to get 
through this 
study as quickly 
as possible 
     
I found the 
study required a 
lot of self-
control 
     
Overall, I found 
I was confident 
during the study 
     
Overall, I found 
I was anxious 
throughout the 
study 
     




     
 
 
Thank you for your time and effort! 
 













1) Recall the task where you performed PSYC 105 study.  How well do you remember 












Good      
Bad      
Friendly      
Unfriendly      
Angry      
Pleasant      
Happy      
Sad      
Smart      
Successful      
Likeable      
Meaningful      
Frustrated      
Confused      
Uncertain      
Empty      
Anxious      
Ashamed      
Insecure      
Lonely      
Stupid      




3) Thank you again for your time.  You are now reaching the end of the research study.  
Before you leave, we would like to explain to you in further detail what the study was 
about and what we expected to find. 
 
 







4) Out of the 15 minutes spent during the PSYC 105 study condition, how many of those 
minutes would you say you spend focused on that task? 
 
 












     
I gave this study 
my undivided 
attention 
     
I sometimes just 
clicked random 
responses in 
order to get 
through this 
study as quickly 
as possible 
     
I found the 
study required a 
lot of self-
control 
     
Overall, I found 
I was confident 
during the study 
     
Overall, I found 
I was anxious 
throughout the 
study 
     




     
 
 
Thank you for your time and effort! 
 








 Debriefing Form 
 
 
Thank you very much for helping us with this research. Your efforts are very much appreciated. 
This page outlines the main questions that this research was designed to answer.  
Past research in our lab has found that people react differently to stimuli that provide smaller 
rewards in the short-term, as opposed to larger rewards in the long-term. This is dependent 
upon differences in personality, and differences in the goals that individuals set and strive for. 
This current research investigates similar questions and also probes basic patterns of thinking 
in regards to how individuals classify particular stimuli as conflicting, or affirming to their 
personal goals. 
 
You and the other participants may have participated in conditions that differ from one-another. 
What condition you participated in was selected at random. Some of you completed 15 minutes 
of personal study (aimed to provide delayed gratification, or satisfy long-term goals). Others 
of you completed 15 minutes of social media engagement (aimed to provide instant 
gratification, or satisfy short-term “impulsive” goals). In line with our past research and our 
hypothesis, we expected that some participants who completed the personal study condition 
would tend to find the study materials as challenging, whereas others may find it threatening. 
Ego threat may be associated with poorer performance on subsequent cognitive tasks (like the 
tasks you performed near the end of the study). This is proposed due to an internal conflict of 
personal goals, and the need for some individuals to gain rewards immediately in order to act 
as a buffering agent and satisfy the perception of ego depletion.  
 
Moreover, we expected that only certain personality types would react to the research study 
condition as a potential ego threat. We actually hypothesised that other individuals’ may view 
this task as more of a challenge, and something that promotes higher cognitive performance on 
subsequent tasks. This is why we asked you so many personality questions at the beginning of 
the study.  
 
Finally, we were also interested in how some individuals performed on the cognitive tasks 
following participation in the social media condition. We did not expect this condition to 
threaten individuals’ ego. However, dependent upon differences in personality, we anticipated 
that some individuals may find this condition as ego-boosting and rewarding. This is 
hypothesised to have positive effects on performance during the following cognitive tests. 
Therefore the results for your timed performance on the cognitive tasks will be compared with 
how you answered the initial personality questionnaires, and dependent upon the condition you 





We are sorry that we were not able to give you all these details up front, before you began the 
study. Doing so could have spoiled the study because some participants might have altered 
their responses based on their expectations. Accordingly, the study required some deception 
about some of the materials. All of you were either told that participation in the personal study 
condition or participation in the social media condition would help you dissociate from the 
tasks you had completed previous. This is not proven research! The real motive behind asking 
you to participate in these conditions was to provide two different environments in which we 
anticipated would either elicit a challenge or a threat to your personality resources, and as such 
would either result in an increase (or decrease) in cognitive capacity on the succeeding self-
control tasks.  
 
Of course, if completing any of these or other materials has raised personal issues which you 
find too distressing, the following contacts are provided for you below. Furthermore, if you 
have any issues with this study or the data collected, please use the contact details below.  
If you wish to acquire a summary of the results of this research or you have a question about 
the research in general or about your role in the study, please feel free to contact Matthew 
Johnston (email: matty.johnston@pg.canterbury.ac.nz) or Dr. Kumar Yogeeswaran (phone: 
+64 3 364 2964 ext.6964).  
 
This research has been reviewed by The Human Ethics Committee of the University of 
Canterbury (HEC). If you have any questions about this process or about your rights as a 
participant in the study, please contact the Chair of the Human Ethics Committee of the 
University of Canterbury, private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz). 
If completing any of the materials has raised personal issues which you find distressing, the 
following contacts are provided for your convenience: 
 
 
 UC Health Centre counselling services, +64 3 364 2402 (confidential, professional 
counselling for UC students) 
 
 Student Support and Services at +64 3 364 2350 or +64 3 364 2987  
 
 Email studentdevelopment@canterbury.ac.nz (confidential peer counselling by UC 
students for UC students).  
 
 












Table 1. Conditional Effects of Social Media - Academic Study Manipulation at values of 
Implicit Self-Esteem (exclusionary dataset parameters 1 (N = 215)) 
 
IAT-D Effect se t p LLCI ULCI 
-0.7935 -0.0640 0.0277 -2.3095 0.0126 -0.1187 -0.0094 
-0.6626 -0.0578 0.0255 -2.2679 0.0134 -0.1080 -0.0075 
-0.5317 -0.0515 0.0233 -2.2158 0.0145 -0.0974 -0.0057 
-0.4009 -0.0453 0.0211 -2.1491 0.0162 -0.0868 -0.0037 
-0.2700 -0.0390 0.0189 -2.0620 0.0188 -0.0763 -0.0017 
-0.1391 -0.0340 0.0173 -1.9721 0.0230 -0.0681  0.0000 
-0.0082 -0.0328 0.0168 -1.9452 0.0305 -0.0660  0.0005 
 0.1227 -0.0265 0.0148 -1.7844 0.0456 -0.0558  0.0028 
 0.1473 -0.0202 0.0130 -1.5580 0.0500 -0.0458  0.0054 
 0.2536 -0.0140 0.0113 -1.2340 0.0803 -0.0363  0.0084 
 0.3845 -0.0077 0.0100 -0.7749 0.1712 -0.0274  0.0119 
 0.5154 -0.0015 0.0090 -0.1618 0.4130 -0.0193  0.0163 
 0.6462  0.0048 0.0087 -0.5534 0.9030 -0.0123  0.0219 
 0.7771  0.0111 0.0089  1.2353 0.5504 -0.0066  0.0287 
 0.9080  0.0173 0.0098  1.7636 0.2320 -0.0020  0.0367 
 1.0389  0.0207 0.0105  1.9721 0.1047  0.0000  0.0413 
 1.1698  0.0236 0.0111  2.1167 0.0565  0.0016  0.0455 
 1.2016  0.0298 0.0128  2.3366 0.0500  0.0047  0.0550 
 1.3007  0.0361 0.0146  2.4711 0.0362  0.0073  0.0649 
 1.4316  0.0423 0.0166  2.5540 0.0264  0.0096  0.0750 
 1.5625  0.0486 0.0187  2.6059 0.0118  0.0118  0.0854 
 1.6933  0.0549 0.0208  2.6389 0.0139  0.0139  0.0959 
 1.8242  0.0611 0.0230  2.6603 0.0085  0.0158  0.1064 
 
IAT-D: Implicit self-esteem scores 
Effect: Effect of condition, centred around 0 (-1 = social media, +1 = academic study) 
se: standard error 
t: standardized test statistic, t-score 
p: calculated probability, p-value 
LLCI: lower limit confidence interval 








Table 2. Conditional Effects of Social Media - Academic Study Manipulation at values of 
Implicit Self-Esteem (exclusionary dataset parameters 2 (N = 205)) 
 
IAT-D Effect se t p LLCI ULCI 
-0.7935 -0.0702 0.0279 -2.5185 0.0126 -0.1252 -0.0152 
-0.6626 -0.0639 0.0256 -2.4953 0.0134 -0.1145 -0.0134 
-0.5317 -0.0576 0.0234 -2.4650 0.0145 -0.1038 -0.0115 
-0.4009 -0.0514 0.0212 -2.4246 0.0162 -0.0931 -0.0096 
-0.2700 -0.0451 0.0190 -2.3693 0.0188 -0.0826 -0.0076 
-0.1391 -0.0388 0.0169 -2.2916 0.0230 -0.0721 -0.0054 
-0.0082 -0.0325 0.0149 -2.1791 0.0305 -0.0619 -0.0031 
 0.1227 -0.0262 0.0130 -2.0118 0.0456 -0.0519 -0.0005 
 0.1473 -0.0250 0.0127 -1.9718 0.0500 -0.0500  0.0000 
 0.2536 -0.0199 0.0113 -1.7577 0.0803 -0.0422  0.0024 
 0.3845 -0.0136 0.0099 -1.3731 0.1712 -0.0332  0.0059 
 0.5154 -0.0073 0.0089 -0.8203 0.4130 -0.0250  0.0103 
 0.6462 -0.0010 0.0085 -0.1221 0.9030 -0.0179  0.0158 
 0.7771  0.0052 0.0088  0.5982 0.5504 -0.0121  0.0226 
 0.9080  0.0115 0.0096  1.1988 0.2320 -0.0074  0.0305 
 1.0389  0.0178 0.0109  1.6297 0.1047 -0.0037  0.0394 
 1.1698  0.0241 0.0126  1.9181 0.0565 -0.0007  0.0489 
 1.2016  0.0256 0.0130  1.9718 0.0500  0.0000  0.0513 
 1.3007  0.0304 0.0144  2.1089 0.0362  0.0020  0.0588 
 1.4316  0.0367 0.0164  2.2370 0.0264  0.0044  0.0690 
 1.5625  0.0430 0.0185  2.3255 0.0210  0.0065  0.0794 
 1.6933  0.0493 0.0206  2.3884 0.0178  0.0086  0.0900 
 1.8242  0.0556 0.0228  2.4343 0.0158  0.0106  0.1006 
 
IAT-D: Implicit self-esteem scores 
Effect: Effect of condition, centred around 0 (-1 = social media, +1 = academic study) 
se: standard error 
t: standardized test statistic, t-score 
p: calculated probability, p-value 
LLCI: lower limit confidence interval 
UCLI: upper limit confidence interval 
 
